PATTERNS OF POWER · THE GUINEAN CASE

The Plot That Would Not End

How the Great-Grandson of an Anti-Colonial Conqueror Rose Through the Communist Trade Union, Alone Told de Gaulle His People Preferred Poverty in Freedom to Riches in Slavery, and Then Delivered Them Into a Poverty That Was Also a Slavery of Its Own; How the Same Revealed Doctrine and the Same Total Foreclosure That Ran the Collection's Other Catastrophes Arrived Here by a Different Road and Built the Same Machine — the Permanent Plot, the Confession Camp, the Manufactured Enemy, the Emptied Country — 1725–2026

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PREFACE

This volume is the Guinean case study of the Patterns of Power collection, and it is the dark twin of the volume that precedes it. That volume followed Aimé Césaire, who at the 1946 fork chose the unromantic integration of his island into France and left his people measurably better off. This volume follows another French colony at the very same fork, twelve years later, and the leader who chose the rupture Césaire declined. In 1958 Guinea alone among France's African territories voted No to de Gaulle's community and took complete independence; its leader, Ahmed Sékou Touré, told the general to his face that his people preferred poverty in freedom to riches in slavery; and within a few years he had delivered them into a poverty that was also a slavery of its own — a one-party state, a confession camp, a manufactured enemy race, and an exodus of a quarter of the population.

Guinea and Martinique are the collection's cleanest natural experiment: two French colonies, one metropole, one fork, one season, and outcomes so opposite that the social world rarely grants such clarity. Read together, the two volumes price the romantic rupture and the unromantic correction against each other in the lives of the governed.

This case carries one further contribution. Its subject was not formed on the Paris-student conduit that produced the collection's other catastrophes. Sékou Touré reached the same revealed doctrine by a different road — the communist-led trade union and the anticolonial mass movement — and built with it the same machine: the permanent plot, the camp, the extracted and broadcast confession, the enemy defined by birth, the emptied country. That the pathology can be assembled from the union hall as readily as from the lecture theatre, and produces the same camp at the end of each, is the deepest thing this volume has to teach.

A note on honesty. The double ledger is kept in both columns. Touré was a genuine anticolonial and Pan-African figure of real consequence — the man who dared the No, the armourer of African liberation, the host of Nkrumah — and France's vindictive scorched-earth departure was a real crime that any account of Guinea's poverty must carry. Neither the stature nor the provocation explains Camp Boiro, and the volume shows why the pathology was structural rather than merely reactive. Nothing here is written for effect.

A NOTE ON THIS COLLABORATION

This book was produced in collaboration between its author and Claude, an AI model made by Anthropic. The division of labour has been consistent across the collection. The framework — position logic, the two dials of formation and accountability, the metabolic trap, foreclosure, the revealed and the tested, the two violences, the loaded word — is the author's; the structural readings in this volume apply it, including the account of the trade-union formation route as a variation on the conduit and the mineral-rent variant of foreclosure. The historical reconstruction, the research synthesis, the prose, and the production are Claude's work, conducted under the author's direction and to the collection's standards.

Those standards bear restating for a case whose archive is still opening. Every date, figure, and quotation here was checked against the scholarly and documentary record during drafting, and the load-bearing facts — the 1958 referendum, the Camp Boiro record, the plot chronology, the repression and exodus figures, the closing-era events — were verified against current sources at the time of writing. The toll of the terror is genuinely contested, and the volume gives the range the sources support rather than a false precision. The one famous sentence Touré spoke to de Gaulle is quoted once; everything else is paraphrased, in keeping with the collection's copyright discipline.

The reader should also know what this collaboration is not. The structural arguments here are models — instruments for seeing, offered as tested and defeasible, not as revealed truth; the volume turns its own central distinction on itself in its final part. An AI's assistance changes the speed and reach of such work; it does not change the obligation, which rests where it always has: on the argument's fit with the record, which any reader can check.

THE ARGUMENT IN NINE PARTS

Part I — The Highlands, the Conqueror, and the Made Colony (c. 1725–1922). The landscape before the man: two rival Muslim aristocracies and no single nation — the Fulani theocracy of the Fuuta Jalon and the Mande conquest-states of the upper Niger; Samori Touré's empire, which fused religious authority onto arms and fought France for sixteen years, leaving the loaded memory of resistance; and the colony France assembled from four unlike peoples who had never been one.

Part II — The Union Man (1922–1958). The boy expelled from a technical school for a food strike who became French West Africa's most formidable organiser; the Marxism that reached him through the communist-led trade union and the study circle rather than the Paris lecture hall — the same doctrine as the conduit's, by a different road; the great strike of 1953 that made him a hero and built the mass movement; and why a genuine popular base made the coming foreclosure reach deeper than any built from above.

Part III — The No (1958). De Gaulle's fork — the community or the complete break — and Guinea alone choosing the break; the sentence about poverty in freedom, delivered to the general's face and echoed across Africa; France's answer, stripping the colony to its wires and lightbulbs to frighten the others; and the rupture Césaire had refused, installing from independence day the permanent grievance and the permanent emergency.

Part IV — The Parti-État and the Turn East (1958–1965). The stripped country turning to Moscow, Nkrumah, and Beijing, and the clumsy patronage that followed; the party fused with the state until it was the only legal thing in Guinea, foreclosing from within a movement grown from below; the first plot, teachers' pay turned foreign conspiracy, costing Moscow its ambassador; and the mineral rent that let this foreclosed regime, alone, keep a metabolism alive.

Part V — The Permanent Plot (1960–1969). The doctrine that could not fail turning every shortage into sabotage and every failure into treason; the cycle of discovered conspiracies as the mode of government; Camp Boiro and the black diet, the confession extracted by starvation and broadcast on the national radio; and the machine, as in Albania and Cambodia, at last consuming the very man — Fodéba Keïta — who had built it.

Part VI — The Invasion and the Terror (1970–1971). The Portuguese-led raid on Conakry, launched to smash the liberation movement Guinea sheltered, that failed to topple Touré but handed his doctrine the proof of the siege it had always claimed; the internal terror out of all proportion to the external attack — the Conakry trials, the revolutionary tribunal, the bodies hung from the capital's bridge; and the two violences, the small visible trigger dwarfed by the vast internal kill.

Part VII — The Enemy Race: the Fulani (1976). The revolution that began in cross-ethnic nationalism turning, as its failures mounted, to a hereditary enemy — the Fulani of the Fuuta Jalon cast as a race of born plotters; the "Fulani plot" that sent Diallo Telli, a founding Secretary-General of African unity, to die of the black diet; and the categorical politics that elsewhere sorted a population by class here sorting it by blood.

Part VIII — The Ledger and the Exodus (1958–1984). The double ledger kept honestly — the real independence, the schooling, the women advanced, the cultural pride, the Pan-African leadership — set against the strangled economy, the terror, and the emptied country; how a fertile land on a mineral fortune became a place its people fled by the million; and how the fork of 1958 comes due when Guinea's ledger is laid beside Martinique's.

Part IX — The Camp Opened, and What Came After (1984–2026). The regime outliving its founder by a week and dissolving without a battle; the camp opened, its crimes exposed, its operators devoured in turn; the pathology outlasting the man — the coups, the stadium massacre on the anniversary of the No, the resource curse

on the world’s richest bauxite; the strongest objections held and answered; and the verdict on the plot that would not end.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

This volume rests on the scholarly and documentary record of Sékou Touré's Guinea and its aftermath, and the principal debts are recorded here in the collection's manner — by argument rather than apparatus.

The landscape of Part I draws on the standard histories of the Fuuta Jalon imamate and the Mande world, and above all on the scholarship on Samori Touré and his empire, including Yves Person's monumental study. The life and the regime follow the standard biographical and historical record, including the syntheses of R. W. Johnson and Ladipo Adamolekun on Touré's Guinea, the work of Mike McGovern and others on the revolution's social logic, and Lansiné Kaba on the 1958 referendum and its meaning. The account of Camp Boiro relies on the survivor testimonies and documentary reconstructions gathered by the Association des victimes du Camp Boiro and related memory projects, and on the studies of the repression they underpin; the toll is given in the contested ranges those sources support. The Operation Green Sea narrative follows the military-historical record and the United Nations condemnation of 1970.

The 1958 referendum results, the departmental and constitutional instruments, and the closing-era events — the 1984 coup, the 2009 stadium massacre, the 2021 coup, the present mineral economy — rest on the contemporary record and were verified at the time of writing; figures for the exodus and the terror are given in ranges. The single quoted sentence is Touré's own, spoken at Conakry in August 1958; all other statements of his and his opponents' words are paraphrased.

Within the collection, this volume stands on *The Machine That Runs Itself* (the framework), *The Paris Apparatus* (which anatomised the conduit this case reaches by a different road), *The Error They Carried Home* (the propagation study), *The Unromantic Liberation* (the Césaire volume with which it forms the collection's natural experiment), the catastrophe studies — *The Doctrine That Would Not Bend* and *The Siege He Built Himself* — whose confession machines and foreclosures this case parallels, *The Foreclosed Republic* (the pressure mechanism), and the second inquiry, *The Order Above the Orders* (the two violences and the loaded word). The errors that survive this apparatus are the production's own.

PART I

The Highlands, the Conqueror, and the Made Colony

How a corner of West Africa held two rival Muslim aristocracies and no single nation — the Fulani theocracy of the Fuuta Jalon and the Mande conquest-states of the upper Niger; how one Malinké trader built, out of the shattered chiefdoms of the Milo valley, an empire that fused a claim to religious authority onto a career of arms and fought France for sixteen years before it fell; how his defeat became the loaded memory the country would carry; and how France then assembled four unlike peoples into a single colony that had never been one — c. 1725–1922

I. Why the Landscape Comes First, and What This Case Adds

This collection has traced a single pathology through several nations: a doctrine held as revealed rather than tested, installed at the apex of an order from which every counterweight has been stripped, producing the permanent emergency, the manufactured enemy, the confession extracted and broadcast, and the population made to pay for the doctrine's failures. It has traced that pathology through regimes whose architects were formed on one conduit — the colonial student carried to Paris, funnelled through the Communist apparatus, and returned home with a programme for total transformation. The volume just completed, on Martinique, showed the conduit's counter-case: a man of the same formation who took the opposite fork, chose the unromantic correction over the glamorous rupture, and left his people measurably better off. The present volume is that counter-case's dark twin. It follows another French colony, at the very same fork, in the very same year — and it follows the leader who chose the rupture Césaire declined, said so in words that rang across Africa, and delivered his people into the exact pathology the collection has spent its volumes anatomising. Guinea and Martinique are the collection's cleanest natural experiment: two French colonies, one voting to stay and prospering, one voting to leave and emptying, their choices made in the same season and their outcomes opposite. This volume is the second half of that experiment, and it carries one further contribution the collection needs. Its subject, Ahmed Sékou Touré, was not formed on the Paris-student conduit at all. He reached the same doctrine by a different road — the communist-led trade union and the anticolonial mass movement — and built with it the same machine. That the pathology can be reached by more than one formation route, and produces the same camp at the end of each, is the deepest thing this case has to teach.

As always, the volume begins with the ground, because the framework holds that a man acts on the costs and benefits visible from his position, and the position is set by a landscape he did not choose. Guinea's landscape held three things this study will need: a loaded memory of anti-colonial resistance, ready to be inherited; an ethnic fault line between two Muslim aristocracies, ready to be weaponised; and a state that had never been a nation, assembled by France from peoples with nothing in common but the border drawn around them.

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II. The Two Aristocracies

The territory France would call Guinea held, by the eighteenth century, no single people and no single state, but it held two organised Muslim traditions whose rivalry the twentieth century would inherit. In the cool highlands of the Fuuta Jalon — the plateau where the Niger, the Senegal, and the Gambia are all born — the Fulani had built, from around 1725, one of West Africa's first jihad-states: a theocratic imamate ruled by an aristocracy of clerics and cattle-lords under an elected almami, literate, Islamic, hierarchical, and administered, with a subject population beneath the Fulani nobility. It was a state of formation as much as force, the Qur'anic school in every settlement, the religious title carrying the political one. In the savannas of the upper Niger to the east lay the Mande world — the Malinké, heirs to the memory of the medieval empire of Mali, the world of the trading Dyula and the warrior nobility, Muslim in its towns and mixed with older observance in its villages. The two traditions were old rivals: the Fulani theocracy of the highlands and the Mande conquest-tradition of the plains represented two different fusions of Islam and power, and the border between them ran through the country's history. The volume marks the fault line now, because the man at its centre would be a Malinké who, three centuries after the imamate's founding, would cast the Fulani of the Fuuta Jalon as his nation's permanent internal enemy, and starve their most eminent son in a cell. The ethnic weapon of 1976 was forged in the landscape of 1725.

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III. The Conqueror

The loaded memory the country would carry was made in a single lifetime at the end of the nineteenth century, and the volume gives it its due because the man of this study claimed the conqueror as his own great-grandfather and wore the claim as a crown. Samori Touré, born around 1830 into a Dyula trading family in the Malinké country, built from the 1860s a state out of the shattered chiefdoms of the Milo valley; he took the war-title fama in 1878 and, in 1884, adopted the almami's Islamic title — fusing, exactly as the Fuuta Jalon aristocracy had, a claim to religious authority onto a career of arms, and giving a diverse conquered population a single idiom of loyalty. At its height his empire ran across the upper Niger; its administration was real, its army — the sofa — disciplined and increasingly well-armed; and against the advancing French it fought, from the 1880s, one of the longest and most skilful resistances in the history of the conquest: a fighting retreat across hundreds of miles, a scorched-earth withdrawal that denied the enemy the country, an arms industry improvised in the bush. He was captured in 1898 and died in exile two years later, and the resistance died with him. What remained was the Guinean Angkor, the Guinean Skanderbeg: the proof, fixed at the threshold of the colonial century, that a son of this soil had built a state and made the greatest power in the region fight sixteen years for it. The memory was available to be inherited — and the framework asks the reader to hold, for Part II, that the man who would inherit it most literally, by blood-claim, would build a state that resembled Samori's in its fusion of belief and force and resembled it in nothing else, least of all in serving the people it ruled.

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IV. The Made Colony

France assembled Guinea in the 1890s the way it assembled most of its African possessions — by drawing a line — and the volume counts the seams because the state Sékou Touré inherited had never been a nation and had no formation of its own to govern with. Inside the French border lay four worlds that had never been one: the coastal lowlands of the Susu and the Baga; the Fulani highlands of the Fuuta Jalon; the Malinké savannas of the upper Niger, Samori's country; and the forest peoples of the south-east, organised in small societies without states at all. France ruled this patchwork as it ruled elsewhere — through appointed chiefs, the chefs de canton, many of them drawn in the highlands from the old Fulani aristocracy, so that colonial authority and Fulani nobility fused in the daily experience of the highland peasant and gave the later revolution a caste to hate; through the forced labour and summary justice of the indigénat; through cash crops, the banana and the coffee and the pineapple, worked for the metropole; and, in its last decades, through the discovery beneath the red laterite soil of one of the planet's largest reserves of bauxite, the ore of aluminium — a fact that would keep the later regime alive long after its own economy had strangled. The colony educated almost none of its people: a thin stratum of clerks and schoolteachers, trained to run the lower administration, formed the entire literate class. Into that stratum, in a small town on the upper Niger in 1922, the subject of this volume was born — poor, Malinké, Muslim, and, by his own insistence ever after, the blood of the conqueror. The landscape had laid down everything the story would use: the loaded memory, the ethnic fault, the made state, the mineral under the ground. The next part is the story of how a expelled schoolboy turned the one instrument the colony had accidentally created — the trade union — into a national movement and then into a machine.

PART II

The Union Man

How a boy expelled from a technical school for leading a food strike became, through the postal workers and the communist-led labour confederation, the most formidable organiser in French West Africa; how his Marxism arrived not through a Paris lecture hall but through the union hall and the study circle — the same doctrine as the conduit's, reached by a different road; how the great strike of 1953 made him a national hero and built the mass movement that would become the single party; and why a genuine popular base made the foreclosure that followed reach deeper than any built from above — 1922–1958

I. The Expelled Boy

Sékou Touré's formation began, like so many in this collection, with a ladder he was thrown off, and the volume marks the pattern because it has now recurred too often to ignore. Born in 1922 in Faranah on the upper Niger, son of poor Malinké farmers, raised Muslim and schooled first at the Qur'anic school and then in the French primary system, he was enrolled at fifteen in the Georges Poiret technical college in Conakry — the colony's ladder for its gifted poor — and expelled within the year, in 1936, for leading a strike over the quality of the food. The volume sets him beside the others the credential system manufactured and rejected: Stalin the expelled seminarian, Saloth Sar the failed Paris scholar, Hoxha stripped of his stipend at Montpellier — and now Touré, thrown out of the one school that might have made him a functionary, at fifteen, for organising his fellows against authority. He completed his education by correspondence and self-study, took a clerk's post in the colonial postal service and then the treasury, and carried out of the expulsion two things that would define him: a grievance against the colonial order that had closed the ladder, and a talent, discovered in the act that got him expelled, for turning a shared complaint into collective action. He was not formed to be a functionary. He was formed, by the manner of his rejection, to be an organiser.

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II. The Union as Formation

Here the volume answers the question the reader of the collection will bring to this case — how much of the conduit's apparatus reached Touré — and the answer is a genuine variation on everything the collection has traced. Touré did not go to Paris as a student; he did not sit in the metropolitan university or the Communist Party's intellectual salons. His formation came through the labour movement. He built the postal workers' union in 1945 and rose fast through the Confédération Générale du Travail — the CGT, the great French trade-union confederation led by the Communist Party — becoming secretary-general of the territorial CGT in 1948 and of its coordinating committee for all French West Africa and Togo in 1950. Through the union he received the doctrine: he read Marx and Lenin, moved in a communist study circle, absorbed the class analysis and the disciplined-vanguard method, and took a period of training at an economic institute in Prague, behind the Iron Curtain. The volume states the structural point precisely, because it is the case's contribution to the collection. The Marxism that reached Ho and Hoxha and the Cambodians through the Paris-student conduit reached Touré through the communist-led trade union and the anticolonial mass struggle — a different institutional channel, carrying substantially the same content: the party as vanguard, the categorical politics that sorts a population into the people and its enemies, the conviction that the movement embodies the masses and its leader embodies the movement. The PCF connection was real but indirect — mediated by the CGT and by the interterritorial party he helped found, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, which was allied with the Communists in the French parliament until 1950 — and the indirectness matters, because it shows the pathology this collection studies is not the property of one pipeline. It can be assembled from the union hall as readily as from the lecture theatre. The doctrine is portable; the machine it builds is the same.

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III. The Strike and the Movement

What the union gave Touré that the Paris conduit could never give its cadres was a genuine mass base, and the volume dwells on this because it explains why the foreclosure to come reached so deep. In 1946 he helped found the RDA at Bamako and, in 1947, its Guinean section, the Parti Démocratique de Guinée; by 1952 he led the PDG. And in 1953 he made himself a national figure through the instrument he had mastered: a general strike across French Guinea, sustained for over seventy days — longer than any other in French West Africa — to force

the application of the new overseas labour code. He won it. The victory made him, at a stroke, the hero of the Guinean worker and the man who had beaten the colonial administration through solidarity and discipline; and it built, out of the union networks, a party organisation that reached into every town and workplace with a density no African party of the era could match. He was elected mayor of Conakry in 1955, deputy to the French National Assembly in 1956, and in 1957 his PDG swept the territorial elections, taking all but a handful of seats. The framework marks the double edge that the rest of the volume will turn on. Touré's movement was authentic — a real popular mobilisation, built from below through the union, carrying millions who had chosen it; this was no Yugoslav-assembled shell like Hoxha's early party, but a mass party with deep roots. And that authenticity was precisely what made the coming foreclosure so total, because a single party that genuinely reaches every village, when it becomes the only party and fuses with the state, forecloses not from above but from within — it captures the very networks of solidarity through which a people might otherwise have organised against it. The union that freed the worker in 1953 became, within a decade, the cell that watched him. The mass base was the movement's glory and, turned into a parti-état, the instrument of its people's silence. In 1958 the movement faced the choice that would decide everything, and its leader chose the rupture.

PART III

The No

How de Gaulle offered France's African colonies a community or a complete break, and how Guinea alone chose the break; how Sékou Touré told the general to his face that his people preferred poverty in freedom to riches in slavery, and how ninety-five per cent of Guineans agreed; how France answered the No by stripping the colony to its wires and lightbulbs to frighten the others; and how the rupture Césaire had refused in Martinique installed, from independence day, the permanent grievance and the permanent emergency that would define the next quarter-century — 1958

I. The Fork

In 1958 the returning de Gaulle offered France's African territories a referendum, and the choice it posed is the exact fork this collection watched Aimé Césaire face in 1946 and decline — the romantic rupture against the unromantic correction — now put to a whole tier of colonies at once. A vote for the new constitution meant membership in a French Community: autonomy within a French-led association, with France retaining the commanding powers but the aid, the administrators, the transfers, and the franc continuing to flow. A vote against meant immediate and complete independence — and, de Gaulle made brutally clear, the immediate and complete withdrawal of everything France provided. Touré had pressed, before the vote, for a third option the constitution did not offer: a genuine federation of French West Africa negotiating with France as an equal bloc, rather than each territory tied to Paris one by one; when France refused the federal path, the choice collapsed to the binary, and Touré chose rupture. The volume marks the position logic, because it is the mirror-image of Césaire's. Where Césaire had weighed a tiny dependent island's actual costs and benefits and chosen the transfers over the flag, Touré — leading a larger, prouder territory, carrying the blood-claim to Samori's resistance and a mass movement built on defiance — weighed the same trade and chose the flag, staking his people's material future on the proposition that liberty was worth its price. It was the braver choice and the more glamorous one, and the volume will spend six parts counting what it cost the people who did not get to weigh it as he did.

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II. The Words and the Vote

When de Gaulle came to Conakry in August 1958, Touré answered him to his face, in the territorial assembly, with the sentence that made him a hero across Africa and beyond: his people, he said, preferred poverty in freedom to riches in slavery. It is one of the great lines of the anticolonial century, and the volume quotes it once, because everything that follows is the tragedy of its inversion. On 28 September 1958 Guinea voted — alone among all France's African territories — to reject the constitution: better than ninety-five per cent said no, on a turnout above four-fifths, and on 2 October the Republic of Guinea was proclaimed, the first of France's African colonies to take complete independence. The volume records the fork's other side for the ledger of the whole collection: three weeks later, on 19 October, Touré's PDG formally broke from the interterritorial RDA, because the rest of that party — led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire — had chosen the Community and the continued tie to France. The same party split down the middle of the same fork: Houphouët-Boigny's oui and Touré's non, the integration and the rupture, dividing one movement into the two roads this collection maps. Côte d'Ivoire would spend its first decades as one of Africa's rare prosperities on the strength of that oui; Guinea would spend them building Camp Boiro. The fork was real, it was contested, and it was chosen — which is the whole reason the outcomes belong to the choosers and not merely to fate.

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III. The Punishment

France answered the No with a cruelty that the volume must record in full, because it gave Touré, from the first day, the one thing a revealed doctrine most needs — a real enemy — and thereby seeded the permanent emergency the rest of the story is made of. Over the two months of its withdrawal, the departing colonial power stripped Guinea of everything it could remove and wrecked much of what it could not: administrators and doctors and teachers pulled out en masse, equipment carried off or smashed, telephone wire torn from the walls, medicines burned rather than left, the plans for Conakry's sewerage destroyed, files taken or incinerated, the very lightbulbs unscrewed from their sockets. It was punishment as policy, designed — in the era's frank phrase — to discourage the others: to make Guinea a ruin that would frighten every colony still weighing the fork into voting

oui. The framework reads the act with the double vision the method requires. It was a genuine crime, and its material damage to a country that started with almost nothing was severe and real; no honest account of Guinea's subsequent poverty can leave France's scorched-earth departure out of the causes. And it was, for the doctrine, a gift. A leader whose entire legitimacy now rested on the No, on defiance, on liberty-at-any-price, was handed on independence day a demonstration that the imperialists were exactly as vengeful as the doctrine said — that the siege was real, the enemy without was proven, and the hardship to come could be laid at the enemy's door rather than the doctrine's. The commitment trap closed on the first morning: Touré had promised poverty in freedom, France had guaranteed the poverty, and the freedom would now have to be defended forever against the enemies whose reality France had just established. What that permanent defence became — the turn East, the single party, the confession camp, the manufactured plot — is the rest of this book. The words at Conakry were magnificent. The machine they licensed is the subject of everything that follows.

PART IV

The Parti-État and the Turn East

How the stripped country turned to the Soviet bloc, to Nkrumah's Ghana, and to China, and how clumsily the new patrons paid; how the Democratic Party fused with the state until it was the only legal thing in Guinea, reaching through a cell in every village into a life with no channel left open; how the first plot — teachers complaining of their pay — became a foreign conspiracy and cost Moscow its ambassador; and how, alone among the collection's foreclosed regimes, this one kept a metabolism alive on the rent of the ore beneath its soil — 1958–1965

I. The New Patrons

France gone and the treasury bare, Touré turned east, and the volume traces the turn because the patron sequence shaped the regime as surely as it shaped Hoxha's. The Soviet Union, China, and the Eastern bloc offered what France had withdrawn — credits, technicians, arms, and the ideological embrace of a state that had defied imperialism — and Touré took them, while binding Guinea also to Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana in a much-trumpeted union (a Ghanaian loan, a paper confederation that Mali would later join) that expressed the era's Pan-African hope more than any working federation. The volume notes, without malice, how badly the new patronage often fitted: the Soviet aid arrived in the forms the Soviet planners had to give rather than the forms Guinea could use, the apocryphal cement hardening on the docks and the inappropriate machinery rusting in the rain standing in the country's memory for a partnership between a tropical peasant economy and a northern industrial one that neither understood. Guinea left the franc zone in 1960 and issued its own currency — later the syli — cutting the last monetary tie to France and to the convertibility that its neighbours kept; the gesture was sovereign and the cost was a money the world would not take, which drove trade into the black market for the rest of the regime's life. The framework marks the structural fact: a country that ruptures its links to the metabolism of its former metropole must find another, and Guinea's search for a patron who would fund it without governing it ran, like Hoxha's, through a sequence of embraces and disillusionments — with the crucial difference, examined below, that Guinea never had to choose autarky, because it had bauxite.

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II. The Party That Was the State

What Touré built at home was the parti-état — the party-state — and the volume describes its architecture because it is the foreclosure of the framework's coda made total. From 1960 the Parti Démocratique de Guinée was the only legal party in Guinea, and it was not a party beside the state but the state's very substance: the party cell — the Pouvoir Révolutionnaire Local — sat in every village and every workplace, the party's youth wing and women's wing and militia enrolled the whole population by age and sex, and every institution the framework counts as a counterweight was either abolished or absorbed. The unions that had been Touré's own base were folded into the party; the press was the party's; the assembly ratified; the courts, when they mattered, were revolutionary tribunals; the chiefs were abolished; private association outside the party was, in principle, treason. The volume underlines the point it made in Part II, because it is what made this foreclosure exceptional: Touré's party was not imposed on the population from above by a foreign hand, as Hoxha's had been, but grown from below through a genuine mass movement — and so when it became the only legal thing in the country, it foreclosed from within, capturing the very networks of solidarity through which a people organises. A foreclosure built from a real movement reaches deeper than one built from a coup, because it has already installed itself in the people's own habits of association before it turns them into surveillance. By the early 1960s there was, in Guinea, no channel through which pressure could be released as reform: no court to appeal to, no press to expose, no party to vote for, no union to strike with, no association to gather in that the party did not own. Pressure could now only store — and the framework's law is that stored pressure ruptures, and that a ruler who has foreclosed every channel must read every rupture as a plot.

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III. The First Plot and the Metabolism Kept

The reading began early, and the volume dates the pathology's first full cycle to 1961. Teachers, that year, complained of their pay and conditions; students demonstrated in their support, and some of the students' tracts carried leftist criticisms of the government and the suggestion that Guinea should choose the Eastern bloc

outright. Touré crushed the movement and named it the Teachers' Plot — and, reading a foreign hand behind it, expelled the Soviet ambassador, Daniel Solod, accusing Moscow of conspiring through the teachers to capture Guinea for its bloc. The volume marks two things in the episode. First, the method that would define the regime was already complete: a genuine domestic grievance — underpaid teachers — was converted, by a doctrine that could not admit its own failures, into a conspiracy directed from abroad, and answered not with reform but with expulsions and arrests. Second, the expulsion of the Soviet ambassador announced the posture Touré would hold for the rest of his life: not satellite but sovereign, playing East against West, taking Moscow's arms and Beijing's credits and, before long, Washington's mining dollars, aligned with no bloc and beholden — in his own account — to none. He called it positive neutrality; it kept him, unlike Hoxha, from ever being wholly any patron's man.

And here the volume states the structural feature that distinguishes this case from Albania and Cambodia and that the reader must hold through the terror to come: Guinea kept a metabolism alive, on the rent of the ore beneath its soil. Touré collectivised agriculture, banned private trade in waves, and strangled the domestic economy into the queue and the black market exactly as the doctrine demanded — but he did not, could not, and never tried to abolish the one sector that paid: the bauxite. The great alumina works at Fria opened in 1960 under foreign ownership; the mines of Boké would follow under an international consortium with American capital; and through them hard currency flowed into the regime's hands no matter what its socialist economy did to the Guinean farmer and trader. The framework names the variation precisely. Cambodia tore out its whole metabolism and collected mass death in four years; Albania sealed its borders and impoverished a generation without famine because it never gutted the domestic coordinating tissue; Guinea did something different again — it wrecked its domestic economy but lived on a mineral rent extracted by foreigners it otherwise denounced, so that the regime never faced the fiscal reckoning that might have forced a correction, and the ordinary Guinean got the collapse while the state got the ore money. The terror this bought could run for a quarter-century without the famine-kill, because the rent kept the apex solvent while the doctrine strangled everything else. The plot, meanwhile, was about to become permanent.

PART V

The Permanent Plot

How a doctrine that could not fail turned every failure into sabotage and every shortage into treason; how the cycle of discovered conspiracies became the regime's mode of government; how Camp Boiro — the detention camp at the heart of the capital — perfected the confession extracted by starvation and broadcast on the national radio; and how the machine, exactly as in Albania and Cambodia, at last consumed the very man who had built it — 1960–1969

I. The Engine

The framework has a name for the mechanism that now took over the governance of Guinea, and the volume states it plainly because the rest of the terror follows from it mechanically. A revealed doctrine is one in which no outcome can count against the doctrine: the revolution is correct by definition, its programme is science, and therefore when the programme produces shortage, collapse, and discontent, the cause cannot be the programme — it must be sabotage, the work of enemies, counter-revolutionaries, the fifth column, the foreign hand. Touré's Guinea installed this logic as its permanent mode of government. The empty shelves that collectivisation and the trade bans produced were not evidence that collectivisation and the trade bans had failed; they were evidence of economic saboteurs, hoarders, and smugglers in the pay of imperialism. The discontent that the falling standard of living produced was not a signal to correct course; it was the surface trace of a conspiracy to be uncovered. And so the regime governed by plot: a cycle, running through the 1960s and accelerating into the 1970s, in which a difficulty would arise, a conspiracy would be discovered to explain it, a wave of arrests would follow, confessions would be extracted and broadcast, and the cycle would reset — the war on private commerce and the "traders' plots" that criminalised the market and drove the economy underground; the recurring discoveries of fifth columns; each plot explaining the last failure and licensing the next purge. The volume marks that this is not the doctrine breaking down but the doctrine working as designed: the permanent plot is the form a revealed doctrine's government necessarily takes once every channel of correction has been foreclosed, because a regime that cannot revise its programme and cannot admit its failures has only one narrative left for its troubles, and that narrative requires a steady supply of traitors.

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II. The Machine

The supply was manufactured at Camp Boiro, and the volume describes it with the care it gave S-21 and the Sigurimi, because it is the same machine and its product is the same. Camp Boiro was a detention centre inside a military base in the heart of Conakry, established in the regime's early years, and it existed to produce two things: dead enemies and the confessions that proved them enemies. The confessions were extracted by torture and by the method that became the camp's signature — the diète noire, the black diet, in which a prisoner was sealed in a cell and denied all food and water until he died, usually within a few days, a technique that killed without the marks and the noise of the firing squad and that the framework recognises as terror rationalised into administration. And the confessions, once extracted, were broadcast: read out on the national radio, the Voice of the Revolution, in the prisoner's own name, naming his fellow conspirators and his foreign paymasters — so that the manufactured plot was not merely recorded but performed, the population made to hear its own neighbours and leaders confess to treasons the regime had scripted, the confession machine's output pumped directly into the formation of every listener. The toll is contested, as such tolls always are, and the volume gives the range the sources support rather than a false precision: estimates run from some five thousand dead at the camp itself to as many as fifty thousand across the regime, out of a population of a few millions. The dead were not, as a policy, returned to their families. The framework notes the exact parallel to the collection's other confession machines and draws the conclusion the parallel forces: three regimes, formed by three different routes — the Paris student, the Yugoslav emissary, the trade union — built, on three continents, the same institution, because the same revealed doctrine under the same total foreclosure generates the same need for manufactured, confessing, broadcast enemies, and a camp is what that need builds.

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III. The Machine Eats Its Maker

The volume closes the part on the episode that is, in this collection, the signature of the pathology in its purest form, and Guinea supplies it as exactly as Albania and Cambodia did. Fodéba Keïta was one of the great figures of Guinean culture — the founder of Les Ballets Africains, the troupe that carried Mande performance to the world; the arranger of the national anthem, whose title was Liberté — and he was also, from 1961, Touré's minister of defence and security, and in that capacity the principal builder of the regime's repressive apparatus, the man who, by the testimony of those who knew the machine, constructed Camp Boiro itself. In 1969, accused of complicity in a plot centred on the town of Labé, Fodéba Keïta was arrested, imprisoned in the camp he had built, subjected to the black diet he had helped devise, and shot without trial in May of that year. The volume states the structure and lets it stand, because the reader has now seen it three times and the repetition is the point: the man who built the confession machine was fed to it; the architect of the terror was named a traitor by the terror; the doctrine's accounting, having run out of external enemies to explain the latest failure, reached into the regime's own summit and took the man closest to the machine — exactly as Hoxha's Shehu, the builder of the Albanian security state, was declared a six-fold foreign agent and destroyed, and exactly as the Cambodian centre consumed the Eastern Zone cadres who had run its revolution. A revealed doctrine under total foreclosure cannot stop manufacturing traitors, because the failures never stop, and when the supply of plausible outsiders runs low it turns inward and eats its own builders. The plot that would not end had begun, by 1969, to consume the men who had started it. In 1970 a real invasion arrived to feed it.

PART VI

The Invasion and the Terror

How a Portuguese-led raid on Conakry, launched to smash the liberation movement Guinea sheltered, failed to topple Touré but handed his doctrine the proof of the siege it had always claimed; how the regime answered a limited external attack with an internal terror out of all proportion — the Conakry trials, the revolutionary tribunal, the bodies hung from the capital's bridge; and how the two violences of the collection's second inquiry played out here as everywhere, the visible trigger dwarfed by the kill it unleashed — 1970–1971

I. The Real Enemy

On the night of 22 November 1970 the siege the doctrine had always proclaimed became, for once, literally true, and the volume gives the raid its due because its reality is exactly what made the terror it triggered so total. Guinea had, since 1960, sheltered the PAIGC — Amílcar Cabral's movement for the independence of Portuguese Guinea, the neighbouring colony — giving it headquarters, training, and sanctuary in Conakry, from which Cabral ran one of Africa's most effective liberation wars; this was Touré's Pan-Africanism in its most consequential and most honourable form, and the volume credits it without reservation. Portugal, to smash the sanctuary, mounted Operation Green Sea: several hundred Portuguese soldiers and Portuguese-led Guinean exiles landed by sea at Conakry to destroy the PAIGC's ships and bases, free Portuguese prisoners of war held in the city, capture Cabral, and — the exiles among them hoped — topple Touré. The raiders freed their prisoners, wrecked some PAIGC vessels and Guinean airfield installations, and burned Touré's summer residence; but they failed to take Cabral, failed to topple the regime, and withdrew within a day. The United Nations Security Council condemned Portugal's aggression; the Organisation of African Unity rallied to Guinea; and Touré emerged with the most valuable possession a revealed doctrine can hold — proof. The imperialists had, precisely as the doctrine said, sent armed men to overthrow the revolution. The framework has met this before: Albania's Corfu mines and Philby-betrayed landings gave Hoxha the same gift, the siege story confirmed by a real and clumsy enemy. The tragedy of the confirmation is always the same — that a real but limited external attack becomes, in the doctrine's hands, the licence for an internal terror vastly larger than the attack itself.

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II. The Terror Out of Proportion

The internal terror the raid unleashed is the clearest instance in this volume of the collection's central distinction — the two violences, the visible trigger and the lethal kill — and the volume counts it as such. The visible violence was the raid: a night, a few hundred men, a handful of buildings, withdrawn by morning. The kill was what followed for years. The regime declared the country riddled with the fifth column the raid had proven to exist, and the plot machine ran at a scale it had never reached: the Conakry trials, mass arrests running into the thousands, a Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal and a National Assembly turned into a court that condemned by acclamation on the strength of the broadcast confessions, and the summary courts at Camp Boiro chaired by Touré's own brother. Ministers, officers, officials, foreign residents, and the archbishop of Conakry went into the camp. And in January 1971, in the terror's most public act, the regime hanged dozens of the condemned — the count runs to eighty-eight — in the open in Conakry, bodies strung from the great bridge across the Tombo and at crossroads through the city, the executions of the "fifth column" made a spectacle for a population instructed to watch. The volume holds the two columns side by side, as the method demands: on one side, a foreign raid that killed a small number and withdrew; on the other, a terror that filled the camp, emptied the ministries, hung the dead from the bridges, and drove into exile a share of the nation the next part will count. The trigger was real and small; the kill was vast and internal; and the doctrine that converted the one into the other is the same doctrine that converted a bad harvest into a traders' plot and a builder of the terror into its victim. The permanent plot had found, in a real invasion, the fuel to become a permanent terror. What it did next was to give the terror a face — an entire people cast as the enemy within.

PART VII

The Enemy Race: the Fulani

How a revolution that began in cross-ethnic nationalism turned, as its failures mounted, to a hereditary enemy — the Fulani of the Fuuta Jalon, the old highland aristocracy, cast now as a race of born plotters; how the "Fulani plot" of 1976 sent one of Africa's most distinguished statesmen to die of the black diet; and how the framework's categorical politics, which elsewhere sorted a population by class, here sorted it by blood — and needed, as it always does, a permanent supply of the guilty — 1976

I. From the People to the Race

The revolution had begun, the volume records to its credit, in a genuine cross-ethnic nationalism — Touré's early PDG had knit the coastal Susu, the highland Fulani, the Malinké of the plains, and the forest peoples into a single movement against the colonial order and its chiefs, and that unifying work was real. But a revealed doctrine under total foreclosure needs a permanent category of enemies, and as the failures mounted and the plausible individual conspirators were used up, the doctrine reached, as it so often does, for a category defined not by what people had done but by what they were. Touré's revolution turned from class toward blood. He came increasingly to staff the party and the state from his own Malinké, and to cast the Fulani of the Fuuta Jalon — the old theocratic aristocracy of Part I, the highland caste through whom France had ruled, the traders and teachers and civil servants who filled a disproportionate share of the educated class — as the revolution's hereditary internal enemy: a people, in the regime's telling, congenitally counter-revolutionary, feudal by nature, and forever plotting. The framework names the move with precision, because the collection has met it in every register. The categorical politics that sorted Russia and China and Cambodia by class — aristocrat, kulak, bourgeois, new person — here sorted Guinea by ethnicity; the kulak and the Fulani occupy the same structural slot, the enemy defined by birth rather than act, the category that can never be exhausted because one cannot cease to be what one was born. The three-century-old fault line between the Mande conquest-tradition and the Fulani theocracy, laid down in the landscape of Part I, was now the axis of a state terror.

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II. The Statesman in the Cell

The category was made flesh in 1976, and the volume gives the year its central figure because his fate measures the whole. Following an alleged assassination attempt and the "discovery" of what the regime called the Complot Peul — the Fulani Plot — Touré denounced the Fulani to the nation as a race of traitors, in broadcast speeches of a virulence that named an entire people the enemy, and loosed a wave of arrests across the Fulani intelligentsia — diplomats, teachers, officials, students, ordinary highland families. Its most eminent victim was Diallo Telli. He was a Fulani of the Fuuta Jalon, and he was, by any measure, one of the most distinguished Africans of his generation: Guinea's first representative to the United Nations, and then the founding Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity, the very embodiment of the Pan-African idea Touré professed. He had returned home to serve as minister of justice. In 1976 he was arrested as a leader of the Fulani plot, taken to Camp Boiro, and killed there by the black diet — starved to death, in a cell, in early 1977, the builder of African unity destroyed by starvation in the capital of the state that had launched African unity's first great gesture. The volume marks the structure and refuses the consolation of individual villainy: Diallo Telli died not because Touré hated him personally but because the doctrine required an enemy category and the category required eminent examples, and a Fulani of his stature was exactly the demonstration the machine needed — proof that the plot reached the summit, that no eminence placed a man beyond suspicion, that the revolution's vigilance spared no one. The formation dial, which the collection has watched regimes turn to install belief, was here turned to install a hereditary enemy: to teach every Guinean child that a whole people among them was born treasonous. It is the darkest use of formation the collection records outside Cambodia, and it drove, as the next part counts, a nation toward the borders.

PART VIII

The Ledger and the Exodus

The double ledger kept honestly — the real independence, the schooling, the women advanced, the cultural pride, and above all the Pan-African leadership set against the strangled economy, the terror, and the emptied country; how a fertile land on a mineral fortune became a place its people fled by the million; and how the fork of 1958 comes due when Guinea's ledger is laid beside Martinique's — 1958–1984

I. The Credit Column

The method requires the double ledger, kept honestly, and Guinea's credit column is real and must be entered before the debit, because the case is not the story of a monster but of a formed and consequential man whose choices, weighed from his position, were not all folly. Guinea won complete independence when its neighbours dared only autonomy, and the pride of that — the demonstration that an African people could say no to the whole colonial apparatus and stand — was a real gift to the continent, an inspiration to the wave of independences that followed in 1960. The regime pursued the Africanisation of a state France had run through Frenchmen, attempted a broad expansion of primary schooling and of literacy, including in the national languages, and advanced the political participation of women well beyond the colonial norm. It fostered a genuine and lasting cultural nationalism — Les Ballets Africains carrying Mande art to the world, the promotion of Guinea's own languages and heritage against the assimilation that had taught its people to despise them. And above all, Guinea under Touré was a leader of African liberation out of all proportion to its size: the rear base and armourer of Cabral's PAIGC through the war that freed Guinea-Bissau; the refuge of Kwame Nkrumah, whom Touré housed and honoured as co-president after Ghana's coup; a backer of the movements against Portuguese and settler and apartheid rule across the continent. The volume enters all of it, because a counter to the comfort of monsters requires that the man's real stature be seen: Touré was a figure of genuine anticolonial and Pan-African consequence, admired across the Third World, and the tragedy of his rule is not diminished but sharpened by the fact that the same man built Camp Boiro.

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II. The Debit Column and the Emptied Country

The debit column is the rest of the ledger, and it is heavy. The socialist economy was a sustained catastrophe: collectivised agriculture failed on some of West Africa's better-watered land until a country that should have fed itself imported rice; private trade, banned in waves, drove commerce into a vast black market flowing across the borders into Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, and reduced the legal economy to shortage and queue; the syli was a money the world would not take; and the national income per head sank toward the bottom of the world's rankings even as the bauxite rent flowed to the state. The volume records the one late bend the regime did make, because it distinguishes Touré from the wholly unbending Hoxha and Pol Pot: in 1977, after the market women of Conakry — the "market mammies" who ran what commerce survived — marched on the presidency in open revolt against the persecution of trade, Touré retreated, restored a measure of private commerce, loosened the security grip somewhat, and in his last years courted France again and the United States, whose capital worked the bauxite. He bent, late and partially, where the metabolism had never been fully torn out — which is why Guinea, like Albania and unlike Cambodia, impoverished rather than starved. But the bend never touched the parti-état or the camp, and it came far too late for the ledger's largest entry: the exodus. Across Touré's rule, something on the order of a million Guineans and more — by many estimates two million, a quarter to nearly a half of the whole population — fled the country, to Senegal, to Côte d'Ivoire, to Sierra Leone, to France; disproportionately the Fulani whom the doctrine had made an enemy race, and disproportionately the educated whom the terror had made a target. It was one of the largest proportional exoduses of any state in peacetime, and it is the debit column's bottom line: a regime is comprehensively judged when a quarter of the people it governs would rather be anywhere else on earth. The framework states the finding plainly. Touré promised his people poverty in freedom; the doctrine and the foreclosure delivered a poverty that was also a slavery — the camp, the confession, the enemy race, the queue — and a great share of the people voted against it in the only way the foreclosure left open, with their feet, across the borders, by the million.

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III. The Fork Comes Due

The volume now lays Guinea's ledger beside Martinique's, because the two French colonies at the 1958 fork are the collection's cleanest natural experiment and the comparison is the case's sharpest instrument. Césaire's island voted to stay, took the transfers, and its people — dependent, unequal, incompletely free, and yet — reached French-level life expectancy and income, kept a free press and real courts, and retained the right to leave that they mostly did not exercise. Touré's country voted to go, took the rupture, and its people got the camp and the queue and the emptied villages, and left by the million because leaving was the only freedom the parti-état allowed them. Two colonies, one metropole, one fork, one season — and outcomes so opposite that the experiment approaches the clarity the social world almost never grants. The volume states the finding with the caution the method requires and the force the evidence permits: the difference was not in the wealth of France, which stood behind both, nor in the character of two peoples, which the framework does not measure, but in the two roads — the unromantic integration that kept the counterweights and pursued material welfare, and the romantic rupture that foreclosed the counterweights and pursued a purity that curdled into terror. Césaire took the cost of his choice in his own reputation and handed his people the benefit; Touré took the glory of his choice in his own legend and handed his people the cost. The fork of 1958 comes due in the two ledgers, and it is not close. The last part follows Guinea past the man who made it.

PART IX

The Camp Opened, and What Came After

How the regime outlived its founder by a week and then dissolved without a battle; how the camp was opened and its crimes exposed, and how its operators were in turn devoured; how the pathology outlasted the man — the coups, the stadium massacre on the anniversary of the No, the resource curse on the world's richest bauxite — and how the strongest objections to this account are held and answered; and the verdict on the plot that would not end — 1984–2026

I. The Dissolution

Ahmed Sékou Touré died on 26 March 1984, in a hospital in Cleveland, Ohio, during heart surgery — in power, in his fourth unopposed seven-year term, twenty-six years after the No, the doctrine unbent in its essentials to the last. The volume marks how completely the regime was the man: within a week, on 3 April, hours before his own party could name a successor, the army seized power without a battle, denounced the rule just ended as a bloody and ruthless dictatorship, dissolved the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, suspended the constitution, and opened the gates of Camp Boiro. The prisoners came out; the crimes came into the light; the survivors and the exiles began the accounting that continues still. And the machine's operators were devoured in their turn, as the collection's machines so often devour theirs at the end: in the settling that followed, Touré's brother Ismaël, who had chaired the camp's tribunals, and the camp's own commander were among those the new order tried and shot. The parti-état, which had foreclosed every channel and manufactured every plot and starved its enemies real and invented for twenty-six years, ended in a week, without resistance, because a regime that is entirely one man's machine has nothing left to defend him with once he is gone. The volume notes the framework's grim regularity: the foreclosed order that stores all pressure does not bend and does not reform; it persists rigidly and then collapses at a touch, and the touch, here, was simply the founder's absent heartbeat.

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II. The Pathology Outlasts the Man

What came after is the volume's soberest finding, because the machine died but the pathology did not. Colonel Lansana Conté, who took power in 1984, ruled Guinea for twenty-four more years — a softer autocracy than Touré's, without the confession camp, but an autocracy, its multiparty elections from the 1990s managed and its power personal. His death in 2008 brought another coup; and in September 2009 the security forces of the junta then in power massacred more than a hundred and fifty opposition demonstrators in a Conakry stadium — an atrocity the volume marks for its date, because the massacre fell on the twenty-eighth of September, the fifty-first anniversary of the No, so that the very day on which Guinea had voted for freedom became the day its state shot down the people who asked for it, the loaded date inverted with a completeness no novelist would dare. A genuine democratic election in 2010 at last brought Alpha Condé — a Malinké, and a lifelong opponent of both Touré and Conté who had spent years in exile and under sentence — to the presidency; and Condé, within a decade, changed the constitution to seize a third term and was overthrown by the army in 2021, the current junta citing his corruption and misrule as it suspended the institutions once again. Guinea in 2026 remains what the whole arc made it: poor, though it sits on the largest bauxite reserves on earth and the giant Simandou iron deposit now coming into production under foreign capital — the resource curse in its textbook form, mineral wealth flowing past a people who do not share it, exactly as the bauxite rent once flowed past Touré's strangled economy into his solvent terror; ruled without the counterweights the framework prizes; the reckoning with Camp Boiro still partial, its records fought over, its dead uncounted, its perpetrators mostly unjudged. The plot that would not end did end, with its author; but the foreclosure he perfected has proven, across four decades and four more strongmen, the most durable thing he built.

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III. The Counter-Positions, Held

The method requires that the strongest cases against this account be given their full force. The first is the anticolonial-hero objection: that Touré's tragedy was made in Paris, not Conakry — that France's vindictive scorched-earth departure and the Western embargo that followed sabotaged a poor new state from birth, and that the collapse and even the paranoia were the wounds of that betrayal rather than the fruits of a doctrine. The

volume grants the premise real weight: France's punishment was a genuine crime, its material damage severe, and any honest ledger of Guinea's poverty must carry it. But the objection cannot bear the whole load, and the reason is structural: France's cruelty explains a stripped treasury and a wrecked infrastructure; it does not explain Camp Boiro, the black diet, the broadcast confessions, the traders' plots, or the casting of the Fulani as an enemy race — and it does not explain why, across twenty-six years, every failure was met with a conspiracy rather than a correction. The pathology was not France's revenge; it was the revealed doctrine under total foreclosure, and the proof is that Guinea's neighbours, poor and post-colonial as it was, did not all build confession camps. The second objection is contingency: that Operation Green Sea was a real invasion, that the enemies were not all imagined, that a leader genuinely besieged is not paranoid to see besiegers. The volume concedes the raid's reality fully — and answers, as it answered for Albania's real mines and real parachutists, that the doctrine's crime is not the seeing of a real enemy but the conversion of a limited real threat into a permanent internal terror out of all proportion, the manufacture of ten thousand traitors from one night's raid. The third is the comfort of monsters, refused here as everywhere: Touré was no cartoon paranoiac but a formed union organiser and a Pan-African statesman of real consequence, and the pathology that ran through him is the reproducible property of the chair — the parti-état, the revealed doctrine, the confession machine — not the private defect of a wicked man. And the fourth is the scale objection, which the volume answers by naming Guinea's specific contribution: this case killed in the thousands, not the millions, because it kept a metabolism alive on mineral rent and bent, late and partially, where the wholly unbending regimes did not — and it therefore belongs in the collection precisely as the variant that shows the terror-camp pathology can run for a quarter-century on rents alone, without the famine-kill, foreclosing and confessing and emptying a country by exile rather than by grave.

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IV. The Verdict

The verdict, then, on the plot that would not end. Sékou Touré is the case in which the romantic rupture — the magnificent No, the promise of poverty in freedom — became, through the revealed doctrine and the total foreclosure of the parti-état, a poverty that was also a slavery of its own: the permanent plot its engine, Camp Boiro its machine, the extracted confession its product, the Fulani its manufactured enemy, and the emptied country its bottom line. He reached that pathology by a road the collection had not yet traced — not the Paris student's conduit but the communist trade union and the anticolonial mass movement — and he built with it the same camp that the Paris students built in Cambodia and the Yugoslav-made cadre built in Albania, which is the case's contribution and its warning: the machine is not the property of one pipeline, but of a structure — a doctrine held as revealed, seated where no counterweight can reach it — that can be assembled from whatever materials a country provides. And laid beside the volume that precedes it, Guinea completes the collection's cleanest experiment: two French colonies at one fork, Martinique choosing the unromantic integration and keeping its counterweights and its people, Guinea choosing the romantic rupture and foreclosing both. The framework turns its blade on itself, as the method demands: everything argued here is offered as tested, defeasible by the camp's still-opening records and the historians still counting, and the reader who breaks it on the evidence does the project's work.

Last, the dials, on Guinea today. The loaded memory of Samori and of the No is invoked still by every ruler who wants the mantle of defiance; the ethnic fault line between highland and plain that the landscape laid down and the terror weaponised has never fully closed; the counterweights the framework prizes — the free court, the free press, the party one may vote for, the association one may join — have flickered and been foreclosed again through coup after coup; the bauxite wealth flows past the people as it always has; and no one, in the sixty-eight years since the No, has yet reached Guinea's children with anything but the next strongman's version of the last one's story. The volume permits itself no prophecy, only the reading the whole collection ends on: that the freedom Touré named at Conakry in 1958 — not the flag, which Guinea has flown ever since, but the real

political liberty of a people who can release their pressure as reform through channels their rulers do not own — is the one thing his rupture did not deliver and his country has, in 2026, still never had. He told de Gaulle his people preferred freedom to slavery, and he was speaking a truth about them that he then spent twenty-six years denying them. The framework counts that gap — between the freedom promised and the freedom foreclosed — as the whole distance of the tragedy, and marks, tested and not revealed, that it is the same distance the collection has measured in every volume: between the loaded word a ruler speaks to legitimate his order, and the thing itself, which only the counterweights he will not permit could ever have made real.